









A Normative Agent-Centric Approach to Regulate Manufacturing Process

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
SeReCo Autumn Workshop 2024, October 17, 2024



Next in Line...


- Problems and Objective
- Proposed Approach
- 3 NPL(s): Extension of NPL with Sanctions
- 4 Normative Agent Architecture
- Conclusions

Case Study: Laboratory Plant myJoghurt [12]




Current Main Limitations in Manufacturing Systems

• Too prescriptive: designers must prescribe all situations and exceptions to be handled



Current Main Limitations in Manufacturing Systems

- Too prescriptive: designers must prescribe all situations and exceptions to be handled
- Inflexible: it requires manual interventions to *recover* from unexpected events and *adapt* to changing situations



Objective

Hypothesis:

- Multi Agent Systems (MAS) enhance decentralization and flexibility in manufacturing by enabling agents to autonomously manage dynamic events
- Normative mechanisms guide agent's behavior while enabling self-regulation and adaptation

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Objective

Design mechanisms for MAS to enable self-regulation and regulations self-adaptation for a trustworthy and sustainable Industry of the Future


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
Multi-Agent Oriented Design & Programming








Multi-Agent Oriented Design & Programming



Multi-Agent Oriented Design & Programming



Research Questions

Design mechanisms for MAS to enable **self-regulation** and regulations **self-adaptation** for a trustworthy and sustainable Industry of the Future

Research Questions

- How to express agent's expected behaviors and enforced behaviors?
- 2 How to enforce agents' expected behaviors?

State of the Art: Representation of Regulations


• How to express agent's expected behaviors and enforced behaviors?

Language	Expected behaviors	Enforced behaviors
NPL, 2011 NoA, 2002 N-2APL, 2012	obligations, permissions, prohibitions obligations, permissions, prohibitions obligations and prohibitions	- - sanction


Extend NPL to NPL(s) with sanctions as a first-class abstraction

State of the Art: Mechanisms for Regulations

We have to enforce agents' expected behaviors?



Organization-Centric Perspective




Agent-Centric Perspective

Organization-Centric Perspective on Managing Regulations

Organization-Centric Perspective: mechanisms and representations are inside

mechanisms and representations are inside the organization, external to the agents


- √ Single point of control
- ✓ Consistency in the representation and application of the regulations
- × Agents have limited autonomy to manage regulations
- × Impractical in highly distributed systems



Agent-Centric Perspective on Managing Regulations

Agent-Centric Perspective: mechanisms and representations are internal to the agents


- Agents are autonomous to manage regulations
- ✓ Efficient in adapting to changes by addressing local needs
- √ Flexible with highly distributed systems
- × Extra costs for coordination and alignment



Agent-Centric Perspective on Managing Regulations

Agent-Centric Perspective: mechanisms and representations are internal to the agents

- √ Agents are autonomous to manage regulations
- √ Efficient in adapting to changes by addressing local needs
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ightarrow In this work, we focus on the agent-centric perspective to manage regulations

State of the Art: Normative Agent Architectures

4 How to enforce agents' expected behaviors?

Agent Architecture	Enforcement Mechanism
López y López et al., 2006	use secondary norms
n-BDI, 2014	always sanctions
AORTA, 2015	trigger another norm or plan
Normative MDP, 2010	inflict a cost for the violation
EMIL-I-A, 2007	adaptive sanction

Embed NPL(s) engine into a BDI normative agent architecture to enable agents to enforce their or the other agents' behavior

Proposed Approach

- Extend NPL to NPL(s) with sanctions as a first-class abstraction
- Embed NPL(s) engine into a BDI normative agent architecture to enable agents to enforce their or the other agents' behavior

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NPL

```
norm <id> : <when>
-> obligation(<who>, <while>, <what>, <deadline>) .
                                                            Bottle
Example
                                                            Agent
                                                                   filling orders
                                                                                       Enforcing agents' behaviors to the
                                                                           Plant
                                                                                         correct filling of each bottle
norm n1: fill_bottle(LQ,X,MN,MX) &
                                                                          Agent
     .mv_name(U)
-> obligation(U, n1, fill(LQ,X,MN,MX),
                                                                                 filling request
                                                                                                         Valve
                                                                                               estimated
     level(X,L) & (L < MN | L > MX)).
                                                                                                        Agent 3
                                                                                               flow rate
                                                                                      Unit
                                                                           Unit
                                                              Unit
norm n2: level(V,X,L) & .my_name(U)
                                                                                     Agent 3
                                                             Agent 1
                                                                         Agent 2
-> obligation(U, n2, update_factors(V,X,L),
     deviation_factor(X, "negative", _)).
```


NPL(s) - Sanction Rule

```
norm <id>: <when>
 -> obligation(<who>, <while>, <what>, <deadline>)
     [if fulfilled: <sanction-rule>*]
                                                        Bottle
     [if unfulfilled: <sanction-rule>*]
                                                        Agent
                                                               filling orders
     [if inactive: <sanction-rule>*] .
                                                                                  Enforcing agents' behaviors to the
                                                                      Plant
                                                                                   correct filling of each bottle
                                                                      Agent
Example
                                                                            filling request
                                                                                                  Valve
                                                                                         estimated
                                                                                                 Agent 3
                                                                                               X FAIL
                                                                                Unit
norm n2: level(V,X,L) & .mv_name(U)
                                                                      Unit
                                                          Unit
                                                                               Agent 3
-> obligation(U, n2, update_factors(V,X,L),
                                                                     Agent 2
                                                         Agent 1
    deviation factor(X, "negative", _))
if unfulfilled: s1(V,X), s2(V,X).
```

NPL(s) - Sanction

Example (Self Cleaning)

```
sanction-rule s2(V,X):
    learning_factor(V,X,_,_,_,C) &
    threshold(_,T) & C>=T
    -> sanction(V, self_cleaning(X)).
```




ld	Sanctioner	Target	Sanction	Condition
S2	unit	valve	Activate the self-cleaning procedure	The violation occurs three consecutive
				times

Next in Line...


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BDI JaCaMo agent architecture




We extend the BDI JaCaMo agent architecture by integrating:

NPL(s) Engine




We extend the BDI JaCaMo agent architecture by integrating:

- NPL(s) Engine
- De Jure
- De Facto



We extend the BDI JaCaMo agent architecture by integrating:

- NPL(s) Engine
- De Jure
- De Facto
- Enforcement Plans:
 - Detector
 - Evaluator
 - Executor
 - Controller
 - Legislator




myJoghurt Case Study: Norm and Sanctions


The norms refer to the correct filling of each bottle.

Sanctioner	Target	Sanction	Pre-condition
unit	valve	Adjust the estimated flow rate	The image is below a threshold
unit	valve	Activate the self-cleaning procedure	The violation occurs three consecutive times
plant	unit	Adjust the unit agent's image	The image is below a threshold
plant	unit	Remove as an option for subsequent filling orders	The violation occurs five consecutive times


myJoghurt Case Study: MAS Architecture



myJoghurt Case Study: MAS Architecture



myJoghurt Case Study: MAS Architecture



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Conclusions

- How to express agent's expected behaviors and enforced behaviors?
 - NPL(s) with the explicit representation of norms and sanctions
 - How to enforce agents' expected behaviors?
 - Normative agent architecture with a comprehensible and flexible module on norm enforcement and sanctions
- → Illustrate in an industrial case study

Future Work

- Investigate self-adaptation on norms and sanctions
- Investigate hybrid perspectives across the MAO dimensions, e.g. by connecting the sanctioning process to the organization [9], or to the environment [6]
- Explore accountability [3] and explainability [16] of the normative functioning

Thank you for your attention!

For further information:

Elena Yan, Luis G. Nardin, Jomi F. Hübner, and Olivier Boissier.

An Agent-Centric Perspective on Norm Enforcement and Sanctions.

International Workshop on Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, Norms and Ethics for Governance of Multi-Agent Systems (COINE@AAMAS2024), May 2024, Auckland, New Zealand. https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.15128.

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